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We develop a framework for assessing the welfare implications of the new EU’s Excessive Imbalance
Procedure (EIP) to be implemented in 2012, with a special focus on the current account (CA)
constraint. For this purpose, we apply a New Keynesian 2-region, 2-sector DSGE model, using the
second order Taylor approximation of the households’ utility around the steady state as a standard
measure of welfare. The compliance with the CA criterion is ensured by modifying the policymakers’
loss function in line with Woodford’s (2003) treatment of the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates.
The introduction of EIP threshold on CA balance results in a welfare loss equivalent to steady-state
decrease in consumption of 0:105% after the euro adoption or 0:033% before that. If we consider the
4% threshold on current plus capital account (rather than current account alone), this cost decreases
to 0:019 under the euro and approximately a half of that without the euro. This suggests that ￿ given
other indicators not considered here ￿ the welfare cost for the converging economies may be higher.
EIP can also be seen as a factor augmenting the cost of euro adoption.
JEL Classi￿cation: C54, D60, E42, F32.
Keywords: Excessive Imbalance Procedure, EMU, DSGE, welfare, constrained optimum policy.
1 Introduction
One of the underlying reasons for the escalation of the euro area crisis was the extent to which internal
and external imbalances have built up since the euro area creation. After this experience, the entire
European Union faced critique for concentrating on ￿scal imbalances (operationalised in Excessive
De￿cit Procedure) and ignoring macroeconomic imbalances. The EU’s response to this critique was
￿rst proposed in September 2010 by the European Commission and entered into force in late 2011 in
the form of Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP, European Parliament and Council Of The European
Union, 23.11.2011b,1).
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2The application of EIP comprises several stages and originates from the analysis of a scoreboard
of macroeconomic indicators with their respective thresholds. Although the European Commission
emphasises that its reading would not run mechanically and the essential role in the assessment of
a country’s imbalances would be played by an in-depth economic analyses, the signi￿cance of the
scoreboard is twofold. Firstly, its reading takes place before the in-depth analysis and hence may
seriously impact on the market’s perceptions and expectations. Secondly, and even more importantly,
the scoreboard is a non-discretionary component of the procedure (as opposed to in-depth analysis)
and the ongoing euro-crisis seems to already have shown that discretion in such procedures should be
minimised.
From this point of view, one could expect that the EIP scoreboard should be prepared carefully and
have solid analytical underpinnings. These are, as yet, missing and this paper aims to contribute to
￿lling this gap. In particular, we concentrate here on the thresholds for the current account balance
set at -4% and +6% of GDP. We treat them as a constraint imposed on the macroeconomic policy and
calculate the welfare consequences of this constraint, as well as the modi￿cations in policies necessary
to attain the new requirement. Understandably, there are substantial di￿erences between states that
do and do not belong to the euro area in terms of feasible policy instruments and we treat the two
cases separately, asking also for the di￿erence in welfare cost of EIP for EA and non-EA countries (or,
inversely, whether it is more costly to adopt the euro with or without EIP).
We also focus on the -4% threshold (rather than +6% of GDP) as it seems to be binding for a
number of converging economies. The intertemporal approach to the current account determination
treats de￿cits as equilibrium phenomena in such economies, but the scoreboard treats all EU Member
States homogeneously in this respect. This may imply running into another ￿one-size-￿ts-all￿ problem
in Europe and this is why we reconsider here the choice of indicator against a possible alternative:
current account plus capital account. This would not a￿ect the big, advanced, surplus economies but
could signi￿cantly relax the constraint for small, catching-up economies in a fundamentally justi￿ed
way.
Our welfare analysis is rooted in the strand of literature originated by the seminal contribution of
Lucas (1987) on the welfare cost of the business cycle. In the context of the European integration, a
similar approach has been adopted i.a. by Gradzewicz and Makarski (2009) to evaluate the welfare
consequences of the euro adoption in Poland due to abandoning the autonomous monetary policy and
the resulting increase in business cycle’s amplitude. As the EIP thresholds imply explicit numerical
constraints on macroeconomic variables, we apply here the methodology of Woodford (2003, ch. 6)
developed for the treatment of the optimum monetary problem under the problem of zero lower bound
for the interest rates. Lipi«ska (2008, 2009) applied Woodford’s framework to evaluate the welfare cost
of compliance with monetary Maastricht criteria in the Czech and Polish economy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the stylised facts about external
imbalances in the European Union and the problems that the EIP attempts to tackle. Section 3
presents the New Keynesian DSGE model that serves the purpose of our welfare evaluation. Section
4 demonstrates how we apply Woodford’s framework to implement the EIP-related constraints into
3the model. Section 5 analyses the resulting welfare loss and compares how the ￿scal (and possibly
monetary) policy responses di￿er when EIP-compliant policies are taken into account. Section 6
concludes.
2 External imbalances in the EU and the euro area: stylized
facts
Before the outbreak of the recent crisis, external adjustment within the euro area was expected to
take place via realignments in competitiveness. Once an asymmetric positive demand shock, say,
pushed one country’s output gap and in￿ation rate on the upper side of the equilibrium, the automatic
real appreciation should have ￿rst deteriorated its competitiveness, which would produce a recession,
which in turn would lead to real depreciation (see European Commission, 2006, for a literature
survey). Obviously, this reasoning also applies to non-EA countries of EU, but they additionally
have autonomous monetary and exchange rate policy as adjustment instruments.
These expectations have turned out to be overly optimistic. ￿Internal￿ real devaluation by means of
price and wage decreases, once it was necessary in the Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal),
hit massive social and consequently political resistance. Agents were not rational enough (cf. Tor￿j,
2010b) to smooth out boom-bust cycles by not allowing competitiveness-detrimental real appreciation
to materialize. Also, the governments a￿orded a decade of low reform intensity (Bednarek-Sekunda
et al., 2010) that resulted in relatively high rigidities ￿ an environment highly supportive of imbalances.
As Barnes (2010) points out, it was all the matter of inertia and persistence that inhibited the
competitiveness channel.
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4The external imbalances themselves emerged along the border between Northern and Southern Europe.
Existing research (i.a. Zemanek et al., 2009; Barnes, 2010; Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon, 2010; Waysand
et al., 2010) unanimously con￿rms that (i) the euro area’s current account was almost balanced, so the
individual countries’ imbalances are an internal phenomenon of the EA, (ii) it was the ￿core￿ or ￿North￿
of the euro area (Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg, Finland) that were depreciating and
lending and the ￿GIIPS￿ (Southern countries plus Ireland) that were appreciating and borrowing (see
Figure 1).
The Excessive Imbalance Procedure, introduced in late 2011 as part of the ￿six-pack￿ of EU regulations
(i.e. in two EU Council and European Parliament regulations, see European Parliament and Council
Of The European Union, 23.11.2011b,1) is intended to provide incentives for governments to avoid
such developments. We pay here particular attention to the external aspect of the regulations, i.e. the
constraint on the current account balance.
The preventive arm of EIP comprises at ￿rst an alert mechanism. A scoreboard of indicators (see
Table 1), along with their economic reading, is evaluated by the European Commission in an annual
report. There are thresholds set for every indicator (in some cases di￿erentiated between euro area and
other countries), also certain combinations of indicators should be regarded as particularly risky (e.g.
remarkable appreciation of REER, deterioration of the current account balance, falling export market
share, growing labour cost dynamics, as well as negative and sizable net international investment
position. The set of indicators was constructed with the intention to re￿ect i.a. the principles of
simplicity, parsimony and forward-looking orientation. The Eurogroup and Eco￿n Council discuss this
report, and ￿ as a conclusion ￿ Member States with potential macroeconomic risks are identi￿ed.
If risks of imbalances are identi￿ed, an in-depth review is prepared. As the European Commission
states, ￿the countries identi￿ed [by means of the ￿￿ashes￿ in scoreboard] are investigated in detail,
by means of a wide set of indicators and analytical tools￿. 3 outcomes are possible: (i) no imbalance
problems are identi￿ed, (ii) some (moderate) imbalance is identi￿ed and EC/Council recommendations
are released as part of the June package, (iii) severe imbalance is identi￿ed. The last possibility launches
the corrective arm by EC/Council recommendation on the existence of an excessive imbalance.
In the corrective arm, Member States are obliged to submit to EC corrective action plans. The EC and
EU Council can either assess this plan as su￿cient and endorse it, listing the adequate corrective actions
and their respective deadlines, or as insu￿cient, asking for a resubmission. If two successive corrective
action plans are evaluated as insu￿cient, a ￿ne is imposed on the Member State under procedure.
Countries have to update the plans every 6 months. The monitoring of an agreed corrective action
plan’s implementation requires regular reports by the Member State. Based on these reports, the
EC/Council repeatedly assesses the undertaken corrective actions and the plan itself. If a Member
State fails to implement the plan within envisaged deadlines, the EC/Council adopts the decision on
non-compliance, set new deadlines and impose an interest-bearing deposit of 0:1% GDP. In case of two
successive decisions on non-compliance, this deposit becomes a (yearly) ￿ne.
In this paper, we focus our attention on the ￿rst stage (scoreboard) and on one indicator in particular,
i.e. current account balance. In our view, solid analytical underpinnings for the scoreboard are essential
5Table 1: Excessive Imbalance Procedure ￿ scoreboard for alert mechanism
Imbalance Indicator Thresholds Additional indicators
external
current account balance (3 year
average, as a % of GDP)
-4% to 6% net lending/borrowing vis-￿-vis rest
of the world (CA+KA)
net international investment position (as
a % of GDP)
>-35% net external debt
real e￿ective exchange rate (% change





REER vis-￿-vis rest of the euro area
export market shares (% change over 5
years)
>-6% export market shares based on volumes
of goods, labour productivity, trend TFP
growth





nominal ULCs (changes over 1, 5, 10
years), e￿ective ULC relative to rest of
euro-area
internal
de￿ated house prices (y-o-y % change) <+6% real house price, nominal house price,
residential construction
private sector credit ￿ow (as % of GDP) <+15% ￿nancial liabilities of the
non-consolidated ￿nancial sector,
debt/equity ratio
private sector debt (as % of GDP) <160% private sector debt based on consolidated
data
general government debt (as % of GDP) <60% ￿
unemployment rate (3 year average) <10% ￿
Source: European Commission (8.11.2011).
for the credibility of the entire EIP. The reading of the scoreboard will probably focus much of the
markets’ attention and may adversely a￿ect the sovereign’s ￿nancing conditions once the indicators
are ￿ashing even though the (later) economic analysis may play down the previous reading. Also, the
experience with the application of EDP suggests that non-discretionary components are essential for
e￿cient procedures, whereby the in-depth analysis ￿ as formulated before ￿ contains more discretion, by
nature and by intention (whereby the latter is understandably for the sake of ￿exibility). However, in
its documents, the European Commission emphasises the lack of comprehensive analytical frameworks
underlying the design of the scoreboard, e.g. the thresholds were set as order statistics from panel
historical distributions.
In this context, another essential problem is related to the fact that all EU countries face a homogeneous
treatment in the EIP, regardless of their level of development. Although the in-depth analysis may take
account of the catching-up process, for the abovementioned reasons it would also be comfortable to
consider it in the design of the scoreboard. Under the intertemporal approach, current account balance
exhibits de￿cits for fundamental reasons and therefore the EIP scoreboard may be more restrictive
for the New Member States of the EU. Figure 1 shows that their performance in terms of CA de￿cit
does not ￿t into the previously discussed North-South dichotomy of the EA-12 group. NMS were all
experiencing CA de￿cit, in spite of highly varying scale of real appreciation (cf. ￿atter regression line
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in Figure 1).
Current account de￿cits in the catching-up Europe range approximately between 6% and 7% of GDP,
depending on the period and group of countries in consideration (see Figure 2). This de￿nitely violates
the threshold of minimum -4% GDP. However, one could think of a measure that takes into account
￿ at least partly ￿ the catching-up e￿ects and leaves aside the part of current account de￿cit that
can be ￿nanced in a relatively safe way. If, for example, we focus on the joint balance of current and
capital account (see Figure 2), we could partly relax the NMS’ constraint by almost one percentage
point without signi￿cantly changing the scoreboard’s mechanics for the EA-12 group.
Our further analysis aims at calculating the welfare consequences of imposing the binding constraint,
illustrated in Figure 2, along with illustrating the changes in policy necessary to comply with this
constraint.
3 New Keynesian DSGE model
We analyse the welfare impact of EIP introduction by means of a New Keynesian DSGE model of a
2-region economy. The model builds strongly upon multi-region currency union models with possible
heterogeneity, such as e.g. ones considered in the works by Benigno (2004), Lombardo (2006), Brissimis
and Skotida (2008), Blessing (2008), Kolasa (2009) or Tor￿j (2010b,a).
The whole economy of the monetary union is represented by the interval h0;1i, whereby the ￿rst region
7(say, home economy) is indexed over h0;wi (relative size of the region: w), and the second (foreign
economy) is indexed over hw;1i. Both economies consist of two sectors. Each of them is characterized
by price rigidities, modelled with Calvo (1983) mechanism. Conventionally, consumers in each region
maximize their utility and producers in each sector ￿ their present and discounted future pro￿ts.
International exchange of goods implies that external adjustment via competitiveness take place and
allows us to de￿ne the current account balance (simpli￿ed here to trade balance).
Henceforth, parameters of the foreign economy are denoted analogously to home economy and marked
with an asterisk, e.g.  and . Lowercase letters denote the log-deviations of their uppercase
counterparts from the steady-state values.
3.1 Household decisions
3.1.1 Intratemporal allocation of consumption
Households get utility from consumption and disutility from hours worked. In addition, utility from
consumption depends on consumption habits formed in the previous period (see Smets and Wouters,
2003; Kolasa, 2009). The constant relative returns to scale utility function takes the following form
(compare Gal￿, 2008):










where Ct ￿ consumption at t, Ht ￿ stock of consumption habits at t, Nt ￿ hours worked at t,  > 0
and  > 0. Consumption habits are assumed to be proportional to consumption at t   1 (see Fuhrer,
2000; Smets and Wouters, 2003):
Ht = hCt 1 (2)


















where  2 (0;1) characterizes the share of nontradables in the home economy and  > 0 is the elasticity
of substitution between the goods produced in both sectors.


















8An analogous relationship holds for the foreign economy. Given this,  is an intuitive measure of
degree of openness and 1    ￿ home bias in consumption.  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign tradables.















































The parameter "T > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between various types of goods in
international trade, k indexes the variety of goods, and j ￿ the households (integral over j re￿ects the
di￿erence in both economies’ size).













































Consequently, "N and "N is de￿ned as elasticity of substitution between various types of nontradable
goods.




tU (Ct;Nt;Ht) ! max
C;N
(6)
where  2 (0;1) is households’ discount factor. Maximization of (6) is subject to a sequence of
standard period budget constraints faced by a representative household. It leads to the standard ￿rst
order conditions that de￿ne the demand for various types of goods as a declining function of their
relative prices and the demand for the bundle to which this good belongs.
3.1.2 Intertemporal allocation of consumption
The standard condition of intertemporal optimality, i.e. equality between marginal loss in utility due
to buying a security at t instead of allocating this money to consumption and the discounted payo￿ at
t + 1, also expressed in terms of marginal growth of future utility, lead to the following log-linearized










(it   Ett+1   ) +
1   h
(1 + h)
("d;t   Et"d;t+1) (7)
where it denotes short-term nominal interest rate at t, Ett+1 ￿ expected domestic consumer price
growth,  =  ln ￿ natural interest rate corresponding to the households’ discount factor .
3.1.3 Labour market rigidity
We apply a simpli￿ed version of a labour market rigidity mechanism described by Erzeg et al. (2000)
and used i.a. by Kolasa (2009). It allows the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure, mrst, to equal the real wage, wt   pt, but only in the long run. In the short run, we let
nominal wages be sticky and behave according to the Calvo scheme. Only a fraction of households,
1   w 2 (0;1), can renegotiate their wages in every period. This fraction remains constant and
households allowed to reoptimize are selected at random. In particular, the probability of being allowed
to renegotiate the wage does not depend on the amount of time elapsed since the last change. Other
households partly index their their wages to past consumer in￿ation. Their fraction is represented by
the parameter !w 2 (0;1). Under monopolistic competition in the labour market, individual domestic
and foreign households supply di￿erentated types of labour services with the elasticity of substitution
"w.
Solving households’ optimization problem leads to the following (home) wage dynamics equation (an




(1   w)(1   w)
w [1 + "w]
[mrst   (wt   pt)]   !w (t   t 1) (8)
3.2 International prices










3.3 International risk sharing
Household can smooth their consumption not only in time, but also in international ￿nancial markets
(Blessing, 2008; Gal￿, 2008; Kolasa, 2009; Lipi«ska, 2008). Under complete markets, equation (7) holds
for both home and foreign economy. This allows to derive the following log-linearized relation between
home and foreign consumption and the real exchange rate qt (see also Chari et al., 2002):
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d;t   qt (11)
3.4 Producers
3.4.1 Real marginal costs
The producers of variety k in the tradable or nontradable bundle face a single-factor production
function with constant returns to scale (see Gal￿, 2008). Following Clarida et al. (1999), we assume
away the price deviations of individual varieties within a sector as of second-order importance in the
proximity of the steady state.
The real marginal cost (as log-deviation from the steady-state) is calculated as a di￿erence between
the wage level in the region (wt) and the sectoral producer price log-level plus the log of marginal
labour product (mpn) (see Gal￿ and Monacelli, 2005), which can be expressed in both sectors as:
mcH



















t are log labour
productivities.
3.4.2 Pricing decisions
There are nominal price rigidities in the economy. Following the usual approach in the New Keynesian
literature, we model them by means of the Calvo (1983) scheme. In a given period, a fraction  of
producers are not allowed to reoptimise their prices in reaction to economic innovations and must sell
at the price from the previous period. The probability of being allowed to reoptimise the price is equal
across producers: 1  in each period, independently of the amount of time elapsed since the last price
change.
Some of the producers (fraction ! of reoptimisers) allowed to change their price do not really reoptimize.
Following Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) we assume that the change in price is partly implemented as an
indexation to past in￿ation. This mechanism leads to a hybrid Phillips curve (see Gal￿ and Gertler,
1999; Gal￿ et al., 2001), commonly considered to outperform the purely forward-looking speci￿cations
in terms of empirical goodness-of-￿t. In￿ation is modelled separately in the tradable and nontradable
sector.

















11and analogously for N.
3.5 Market clearing conditions
Equilibrium on the world markets of individual goods requires equality of overall production and
consumption of every variety k in the basket of domestically produced tradables. This implies the
following log-linearized relationships:
yH
t = ~ wct + (1   ~ w)c
t   [ ~ w + (1   ~ w)(1   )]st   ~ wxt   (1   ~ w)x
t (15)
yF
t = ~ wct + (1   ~ w)c




w(1   )(1   )
w(1   )(1   ) + (1   w) (1   )
~ w =
w(1   )
w(1   ) + (1   w)(1   )(1   )
(17)
Market clearing conditions for the nontradable sector can be written as:
yN
t = (1   )xt + ct + gt yN
t = (1   )x
t + c
t (18)
whereby gt denotes the demand resulting from the domestic government’s purchases.
3.6 Policy frameworks
In this paper, we consider 2 policy frameworks:
(a) two countries form a monetary union;
(b) both regions represent autonomous monetary regimes.
To accommodate the latter case in the model, one needs to adjust the above setup it in three ways (cf.
Tor￿j, 2011):
￿ there are separate home and foreign interest rates in home and foreign Euler equations for
consumption (7);
￿ terms of trade dynamics (9) is additionally a￿ected by the nominal exchange rate dynamics;
￿ nominal exchange rate evolves according to a standard UIP equation, depending on the interest
rate disparity and an UIP shock.
12Regardless of the regime, the domestic government pursues Ramsey optimum macroeconomic policy
under commitment in a timeless perspective, maximising a measure of domestic agents’ welfare. It
performs this optimisation task with respect to either one instrument ( gt ￿ government expenditures,
in a monetary union) or two instruments (gt and it ￿ domestic nominal interest rate, in an autonomous
monetary regime).
3.6.1 Foreign economy
The foreign economy’s (or monetary union’s) central bank’s monetary policy is described with a Taylor
(1993) rule with smoothing, which is commonly applied in the literature and empirically tested as an
adequate tool for both the euro area (see e.g. Sauer and Sturm, 2003). The common nominal interest
rate is set according to the equation:
it =  + (1   )(~ t + y~ yt) + it 1 + "i
t (19)
where it ￿ central bank policy rate at t, ~ yt ￿ the output gap in a currency union, ~ t ￿ in￿ation rate in
a currency union,  2 (0;1) ￿ smoothing parameter,  > 1; y > 0 ￿ parameters of central bank’s
response to deviations of in￿ation and output from the equilibrium levels. The condition  > 1 is
necessary to satisfy the Taylor principle (Taylor, 1993), leading to a unique equilibrium.
In the case of two separate monetary regimes, ~ yt and ~ t are simply the respective values for the foreign
economy. For the monetary union, both variables aggregate the values for individual regions, according
to their size. Consequently, if the home economy is small, ￿foreign￿ and ￿unionwide￿ monetary policy
is conducted in almost the same way.
As we do not focus on the foreign economy, we assume a neutral foreign ￿scal policy with balanced
budget at all times.
3.6.2 Home economy
Domestic ￿scal (or monetary and ￿scal) policy maximises the measure of welfare developed as second
order Taylor expansion of the utility function around the steady state  C:
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where ^ vt denotes the vector of log-linearised model’s variables, t ￿ vector of structural shocks,
Av;Avv;Av ￿ coe￿cient matrices (see Appendix 1), tip(t) ￿ terms independent of policy (but only






terms of order 3 or higher.
The maximisation task is performed with respect to gt (or gt and it), subject to constraints given by
log-linearised structural equations of the model. Note that there are linear terms in equation (20) due
13to the presence of i.a. open economies and monopolistic competition. Benigno and Woodford (2005)
argue that such terms may result in inaccurate welfare ranking of alternative policies. Following i.a.
Lipi«ska (2008, 2009), we apply the method by Benigno and Woodford proposed to eliminate these
linear terms and replace them with appropriate quadratic terms by exploiting 2nd order approximations
to structural equations.
3.6.3 Excessive Imbalance Procedure ￿ constrained current account balance
In order to incorporate the constraint on the current account balance resulting from the EIP scoreboard
into the model, we de￿ne the current account balance as:
cat = yH
t   (1   )ct (21)
i.e. the di￿erence between home tradable output and the (average) share of consumption of tradable
goods times current consumption. As these log-linearised variables are expressed as log-deviations (i.e.
percentage di￿erences) from the steady state level, one can think of this di￿erence as an approximate
relation of current account to (steady-state) output ratio and hence constrain it as follows:
 4  cat  6 (22)
Alternatively, if we constrain the joint current-capital account balance ( cat + kat) instead:
 4  cat + kat  6
and bearing in mind that for the NMS-12 sample kat  1 on average (see Section 2):
 4  cat + 1  6
we obtain another (counterfactual) constraint for the NMS:
 5  cat  5 (23)
3.7 Model calibration
Table 2 describes the calibration of the model, based on three sources. Most parameters (elasticities
of substitution between home and foreign tradables, Calvo probabilities, parameters of indexation,
habit persistence, disutility from labour and the Taylor rule) were estimated with full information
maximum likelihood method by Tor￿j (2010a). They were chosen so as to represent a ￿median￿ euro
area country, i.e. as a median over the estimates in the group of 12 euro area countries. In the study of
Tor￿j (2010a), the model’s parameters were estimated in 12 country pairs, in which the home economy
14represented one of the 12 countries under consideration and the foreign economy represented the rest
of the monetary union. This median country has a relative size of 3:4% of the union. Country weight,
as well as ,  and , were calibrated in a standard way in the same article and also represent a median
over the 12 countries.
Inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( ) and elasticity of substitution between the tradables
and nontradables () were calibrated in line with Stockman and Tesar (1995). Finally, the parameters
describing the stochastic properties of the disturbance vector (serial correlations and variances) are
based on the values obtained by Kolasa (2009) for the euro area. Wherever possible, the home and
foreign economy are described by the same parameter values.
Table 2: Calibration of the model
parameter value parameter value parameter value
 1:666 d = 
d 0:65  =  0:841
 1:275 H = F 0:62  0:704
!H = !F 0:391 N = 
N 0:70  1:795
!N = !
N 0:147 W = 
W 0:62 y 0:482
!W = !
W 0:098 i = 
i 0  =  0:995
H = F 0:447 2
d = 2








N 0:912  =  0:765
h = h 0:770 2
W = 2
W 5:52 w 0:034
 =  0:5 2
i = 2
i 0:092 "W 3:000
 =  2:0
Source: author.
4 Constrained macroeconomic policy under EIP
Given the model’s calibration described in Subsection 3.7, theoretical standard deviation of current
account balance equals 2:93 with the euro and 3:18 without it (due to higher terms of trade volatility
under nonzero variance of UIP premium). With a zero steady state 1, a double of this clearly exceeds
the -4 bound on cat and ￿ by a narrower margin ￿ also the hypothetical -5 bound (resulting from the
same constraint imposed on cat + kat). This is why we can regard the unconstrained optimum policy
as violating the EIP thresholds.
In operationalising this constraint, we refer to Woodford’s (2003, ch. 6) treatment of the problem with
zero lower bound on the interest rates. The idea behind this is to ensure that a variable does not hit
the constraint by keeping its average at least k standard deviations away from the bound. Let k = 2
(implying the ful￿lment of the EIP condition approximately 95% of the time). Also let K = 1 + k 2
1Zero steady state in this model is rather illustrative and simplifying than adequate for the NMS. In the intertemporal
model of the catching-up process, the mid-term equilibrium value should be negative and empirical data in Figure 2
re￿ect this. In this case, EIP would be even more restrictive for the NMS. It remains, however, an open question what
this equilibrium value exactly would be and hence we leave further consideration of this for future research.














ss   2  sd result
¿ 2.93 -4 -5 0 -5.85 violated
no ¿ 3.18 -4 -5 0 -6.37 violated
Source: author.











t (LB + cat)
#2
(24)
Consider (20) as W0 =  C1 E0
1 X
t=0





, i.e. the welfare measure W0 as a
discounted stream of one-period welfare Wt. Denote one-period loss as its opposite, i.e. Lt   Wt. In
line with Proposition 6.9 by Woodford (2003, p. 428) and Proposition 1 by Lipi«ska (2008), one can
show that the optimum policy constrained by (24) is characterised by the following loss function:





￿ the target value for cat can be expressed as caT =  LB + K  (1   )
1 X
t=0
t (cat + LB) > 0;
￿ policy coe￿cient C > 0 and C > 0 i￿ the additional constraint is binding (see Table 3).
Strictly positive values of the additional loss function coe￿cient under EIP, C, can be found
iteratively. They should be increasing from 0 until the constraint (24) is hit, but no more, in order
to attain maximum feasible welfare. For the parameter set in consideration, both policy regimes and
both versions of EIP indicator in question, C ranges from 1:53 to 14:77. The loss function is the most
aggressively corrected in response to EIP when the more restrictive (factual) version of the indicator
is in force, i.e. CA   4%, as well as after the euro adoption, when less policy tools are available.
Also, the policy response to current account deviations is more aggressive under the euro with less
Table 4: Additional loss function coe￿cient C ￿ value under di￿erent policy regimes




16Table 5: Welfare ranking of di￿erent policy regimes
Welfare estimate without EIP CA   4% CA + KA   4%
euro -4437.9 -5489.5 -4632.0
non-euro 1562.2 1231.6 1464.5
Timeless perspective, in [%2], up to a constant. Higher number implies higher welfare ranking
(absolute or relative di￿erences not directly interpretable).
Source: author.
restrictive (counterfactual) version of the indicator (i.e. CA+KA   4%) than without the euro and
with more restrictive indicator. That is, the euro-dimension probably matters more for the welfare
ranking than the indicator-dimension.
It is also worth mentioning that the inclusion of the lower bound threshold is resulting in a slight bias
towards targeting a CA surplus (0;2 0;4% GDP). It is higher under the more restrictive EIP version,
as well as under ￿exible exchange rate (to keep a bu￿er for nominal rate ￿uctuations).
5 Welfare and policy responses under EIP
As expected, the introduction of policy targeting to comply with the EIP thresholds for the CA balance
has turned out to be welfare-decreasing, although to a lesser extent if the alternative formulation of
the indicator (CA + KA   4%) is taken into account (see Table (5)). This is true for both policy
regimes in question, i.e. in the euro area and in an autonomous monetary policy regime. At the same
time, and in line with previous research, the welfare measures in the economy that participates in the
monetary union are lower than the analogous values for a non-euro economy. 2
The values of welfare (in Table 5) are approximated up to a constant and not directly interpretable,
either in absolute or relative terms. It is therefore a common practice to focus on their di￿erences
expressed in an alternative metric, i.e. as an equivalent shift in steady state consumption (cf. Lucas,
1987; Gradzewicz and Makarski, 2009; Lipi«ska, 2008, 2009):
 = (1   )
WU   WC
 C1  (26)
where WU, WC ￿ welfare under unconstrained and constrained policy (respectively) under comparison.
The value of  in (26) can be interpreted as the fraction of consumption that consumers would give up
on a permanent basis, which would make them equally unhappy as the transition from unconstrained
to constrained policy regime (or, in other words, the maximum fraction of their consumption that they
would give up to avoid this transition).
In this setup, the introduction of EIP threshold on CA balance results ceteris paribus (i.e. taking into
account this threshold only) in a welfare loss equivalent to steady-state decrease in consumption of
2Like Gradzewicz and Makarski (2009), we do not take into account possible bene￿ts from the euro adoption in
Poland and focus exclusively on the cost of di￿erent business cycle properties.
17Table 6: Shift to constrained policy: equivalent decline in steady-state consumption
Unconstrained policy Constrained policy*










CA + KA   4%
0.0194 3.2
no ¿ no ¿ 0.0098 1.6
no ¿ no EIP ¿ CA   4% 0.7052 117.5




no EIP 0.6000 100
CA   4% CA   4% 0.6721 112.0
CA + KA   4% CA + KA   4% 0.6097 101.6
* ￿ imposed policy constraint marked in bold. Source: author.
0:105% after the euro adoption or 0:033% before that. These numbers are generally comparable with
their counterparts from the previous literature on the welfare cost of business cycles: Lucas (1987)
estimated the cost of business cycle itself at approximately 0:05%, Lipi«ska (2009) ￿ the cost of Poland’s
ful￿lment of the Maastricht criteria at 0:016%, and Gradzewicz and Makarski (2009) ￿ the cost of euro
adoption in Poland at 0:055%). If we consider the 4% threshold on current plus capital account (rather
than current account alone), this cost decreases to 0:019 under the euro and approximately a half of
that without the euro.
Interestingly, the estimated cost of the EIP threshold is substantially lower than the cost of euro
adoption. From a di￿erent perspective, however, one can see the introduction of CA threshold under
EIP as a factor augmenting the cost of euro adoption. Under the less restrictive version of the indicator,
this rise is low (1.6%), but if we take into consideration the factual threshold of  4% for the CA alone,
the cost of euro adoption rises by a factor of 1:12.
The analysis of impulse-response functions of the government’s policy variables gives more insight into
the nature of constrained policy. After a positive demand shock in the home economy (Figure 3),
the domestic producers quickly lose competitiveness and the ￿scal policy steps in with an o￿setting
increase in spending for nontradable output. This policy response is the most aggressive without EIP
(black line). If the  4% threshold is introduced on CA balance, the ￿scal policy cannot a￿ord such an
active intervention and the response remains limited (dark red line). Imposing the limit on CA+KA
balance constituted the intermediate scenario between these two.
Without the euro adoption, the pro￿le of government expenditures is initially di￿erent: they are
reduced at impact as the loss in competitiveness is not immediate. Once it occurs, however, the
response pattern is analogous, i.e. the ￿scal policy is also the most aggressive without EIP and the
least aggressive with its more restrictive version, i.e. with a limit on CA alone. Note that in this
case, the main burden of adjustment is thrust upon the monetary policy tightening (right panel of 3)
and that all the paths of ￿scal response remain moderate as compared to the case of monetary union
membership, where g is the only available instrument. Also note that without the euro, the three
EIP-related scenarios are very similar.
18Figure 3: Home policy response to positive demand shock
(a) ￿scal policy
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no euro, no EIP
no euro, CA
no euro, CA+KA
Inversely, in the case of a positive supply shock in the tradable sector, the ￿scal (and possibly monetary)
policy remains the most aggressive under EIP in its most restrictive version. The current account
balance quickly improves, boosting the output. The monetary policy steps in with some tightening to
contain it, and the ￿scal policy ￿ with some expansion to increase consumption. They are both more
aggressive under EIP as they target to keep these two variables possibly close to each other in order
to avoid a high surplus in CA (or a high de￿cit, in a symmetric case of adverse supply shock in the
tradable sector). In this case, however, an aggressive policy is producing more volatility rather than
o￿seting it and the welfare decreases. Supply shocks in the nontradable sector do not translate into
immediate shifts in international competitiveness, and hence the CA (or CA+KA) constraint does not
matter for the adjustment policy.
After an adverse labour supply shock, ￿scal policy response is slightly more persistent under EIP.
Monetary policy, however, remains more moderate and prefers to allow for some overshooting and
oscillatory adjustment rather than react in an optimum manner at the beginning. These e￿ects,
however, are of second order in terms of economic signi￿cance.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider welfare consequences of imposing the threshold on current account balance
in the Excessive Imbalance Procedure currently introduced in the European Union. To operationalise
this idea, we apply Woodford’s (2003) framework of constrained optimum policy, designed for the
treatment of zero lower bound on interest rates.
The introduction of EIP threshold on CA balance results in a welfare loss equivalent to steady-state
decrease in consumption of 0:105% after the euro adoption or 0:033% before that. These numbers
are generally comparable with their counterparts from the previous literature on the welfare cost
19Figure 4: Policy response to positive supply shock in T sector
(a) ￿scal policy





























Interest rate − response to T supply shock
 
 
no euro, no EIP
no euro, CA
no euro, CA+KA
Figure 5: Policy response to positive supply shock in NT sector
(a) ￿scal policy
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20Figure 6: Policy response to adverse labour supply shock
(a) ￿scal policy






























Interest rate − response to labour supply shock
 
 
no euro, no EIP
no euro, CA
no euro, CA+KA
of business cycles: Lucas (1987) estimated the cost of business cycle itself at approximately 0:05%,
Lipi«ska (2009) ￿ the cost of Poland’s ful￿lment of the Maastricht criteria at 0:016%, and Gradzewicz
and Makarski (2009) ￿ the cost of euro adoption in Poland at 0:055%). If we consider the 4% threshold
on current plus capital account (rather than current account alone), this cost decreases to 0:019 under
the euro and approximately a half of that without the euro.
The abovementioned di￿erences seem to stem mainly from (i) less aggressive (and hence less
volatility-containing) ￿scal policy responses to demand shocks under EIP and (ii) more aggressive
(but sub-optimum, and hence volatility-increasing) responses of ￿scal (and ￿ if available ￿ monetary)
policy to tradable supply shocks.
The estimated cost of the EIP threshold seems to be substantially lower than the cost of euro adoption.
From a di￿erent perspective, however, one can see the introduction of CA threshold under EIP as a
factor augmenting ceteris paribus the cost of euro adoption by a factor of approximately 1:12.
This analysis should be supplemented with a number of aspects in further research. More insight
should be taken into the model’s calibration, including also testing the sensitivity to parameter values.
The process of real convergence was simpli￿ed here, i.e. the capital account was exogenously set to its
sample average and the steady-state current account was set to zero; instead, the catching-up process
in terms of productivity should be modelled. Going beyond the CA threshold, further indicators of
the EIP scoreboard should be included in the analysis. This should also be analysed jointly with the
EDP requirements, as EIP-constrained ￿scal policy might ￿nd it more di￿cult to comply with EDP
(or inversely). Finally, further research should attempt to confront the welfare cost of CA threshold
in EIP with possible bene￿ts from increased macroeconomic stability.
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